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Abstract
A short text in the hand of David Hilbert, discovered in Go¨ttingen a
century after it was written, shows that Hilbert had considered adding a
24th problem to his famous list of mathematical problems of the year 1900.
The problem he had in mind was to find criteria for the simplicity of proofs
and to develop a general theory of methods of proof in mathematics. It
is discussed to what extent proof theory has achieved the second of these
aims.
David Hilbert presented his famous list of open mathematical problems at
the international congress in Paris in 1900. First in the list was Cantor’s con-
tinuum problem, the question of the cardinality of the set of real numbers. The
second problem concerned the consistency of the arithmetic of real numbers,
i.e., mathematical analysis, and so on until a problem dealing with the calculus
of variations, the 23rd and last problem—or so it was for the whole century,
when German historian of science Ru¨diger Thiele found from old archives in
Go¨ttingen some notes in Hilbert’s hand:
As a 24th problem of my Paris talk I wanted to pose the problem:
criteria for the simplicity of proofs, or, to show that certain proofs
are simpler than any others. In general, to develop a theory of proof
methods in mathematics.
Hilbert’s text in German, with a picture of the handwritten original, is found
in T. Koetsier (2001). We shall here discuss the general part of Hilbert’s last
problem to which a large part of foundational research in mathematics has been
dedicated since the 1920s, namely proof theory.
What were the prevailing ideas about mathematical proof around the year
1900? Toward the end of the preceding 19th century, there was a lot of work
on the axiomatization of elementary geometry. The traditional big question of
elementary geometry had always been the role of Euclid’s parallel postulate.
Thus, questions of independence of axioms were studied, and such questions are
well-posed only relative to a system of mathematical proof. A mere listing of the
axioms would not be enough. Perhaps the first one to explicitly give principles
of proof in addition to axioms was the German mathematician Gottlob Frege,
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in his small book titled “Begriffsschrift” (Concept notation) of the year 1879.
This book laid the foundations of modern logic: it contained the logic of the
connectives and quantifiers together with their rules of inference. The subtitle of
Frege’s book announced that his “concept notation” was “a formula language
for pure thought, built upon the model of arithmetic.” Together with such
pioneers as Giuseppe Peano, the thought emerged of presenting mathematical
statements entirely in formulas.
Frege’s notation was forbidding, actually two-dimensional, and his writings
were not properly understood. His central discovery, namely what the principles
of reasoning with the universal quantifier are, was saved by one single reader
around 1902: Bertrand Russell’s in his 1903 book The Principles of Mathe-
matics. He tells in the preface that he had seen Frege’s 1893 Grundgesetze
der Arithmetik but added that he “failed to grasp its importance or to under-
stand its contents,” the reason being “the great difficulty of his symbolism.”
Upon further study, he wrote a lengthy appendix with the title The logical and
arithmetical doctrines of Frege, and ended up with the three-volume Principia
Mathematica in 1910–13 in which Frege’s logic is in a central position.
Russell’s work, thus, used the notation of Peano and the principles of proof
of Frege. A conditional statement, say “AimpliesB,′′ waswrittenasA⊃ B in
which the horseshoe is a stylized version of a horizontally inverted “C” used by
Peano. The symbol derives from the word “consequence.” To express existence,
Peano analogously inverted the letter “E” with the formula ∃xA(x), there exists
an x such that A(x) holds. (Gerhard Gentzen in 1933 introduced the vertically
inverted “A” to express universality, as in ∀xA(x).)
Russell’s (and Frege’s) formulation of logic started with axioms and included
two rules of proof: 1. Whenever a conditional statement A ⊃ B and its condi-
tion A have been proved, it is allowed to conclude B. 2. Whenever the property
A(x) has been proved for an arbitrary x, it is allowed to conclude the univer-
sally quantified statement ∀xA(x). It is sufficient to consider only implication
and universal quantification and their rules, because the rest of the connectives
and quantifiers can be defined: Negation ¬A is obtained as a special case of
implication, by substituting for B some impossible statement, such as 0 = 1 in
arithmetic. Next disjunction can be defined by A ∨ B ≡ ¬A ⊃ B, conjunction
by A&B ≡ ¬(A ⊃ ¬B), and existence by ∃xA(x) ≡ ¬∀x¬A(x).
It is common to consider Hilbert’s book Grundlagen der Geometrie (The
Foundations of Geometry) of the year 1899 as the beginning of formalized math-
ematics. Such a conception prevails only because the book is not read; there
one finds no formula language for geometry, not to speak of explicit principles
of proof. The axioms and proofs of geometry in Hilbert are verbal explanations
not unlike those found in Euclid more than two thousand years earlier.
The aim of formalization is that “nothing should be left to guesswork,” as
Frege expressed it in 1879. The point of departure is a choice of basic concepts,
and the method that of trial and error. The lack of formalization and “rigor”
in Hilbert’s geometry (a word he liked to use) led to errors: For example, the
concept of parallel lines was adequately presented only in the seventh edition of
the book, in 1930. Another example of “guesswork:” Hilbert states that “any
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two points that are on different sides of a line in a plane, are distinct,” but he
gives no reason for why this should follow. To think that it is obvious is precisely
to betray the point of formalization. Here is a possible argument: Let the two
points be a and b and the line l. Let us call the side on which a is “the left side,”
formally, L(a, l), and similarly for “the right side” R(b, l). Let now L(a, l) and
R(b, l), and assume for the sake of the argument that a = b. By substituting
the expression b for a in the formula L(a, l), we conclude L(b, l). Thus, we need
the axiom ¬(L(b, l)&R(b, l)) (“no point is on both sides of a line”) to conclude
that a = b is impossible if L(a, l) and R(b, l) are assumed.
One essential step of inference in the above was a principle of substitution
of equals, tacitly used by Hilbert. In modern terms, we state it by requiring
that a property such as L(a, l) is a congruence relative to the equality of points.
Remarkably, some students of Peano such as the geometer Mario Pieri had un-
derstood the importance of substitution principles even before Hilbert published
his geometry.
Turning now to the principles of proof of Hilbert’s geometry, there is noth-
ing to report. Hilbert’s first thoughts for a theory of proofs are from the year
1904. At this stage, the representation of mathematics as a formula language
and of mathematical proof as a purely symbolic manipulation of formulas with-
out considering their meaning is clear. The central and almost only aim of the
exercise of formalization is to show the consistency and completeness of formal-
ized arithmetic and analysis. When this aim is reached, the problems about
the foundations of mathematics can be forgotten, left behind for good, thought
Hilbert. Here Hilbert’s attitude is completely different from what his statement
of the 24th problem only four years earlier suggests. Now it would not mat-
ter at all in what way mathematics is formalized, if the two central aims of
formalization are reached.
We know since the results of Go¨del that Hilbert’s original proof-theoretic
program failed: By his first incompleteness theorem, there is no complete for-
malization even for the case of arithmetic. Secondly, by the second incom-
pleteness theorem, the consistency of Peano arithmetic is one of the unprovable
“Go¨del sentences” and therefore has no strictly finitary, hence no “absolutely re-
liable,” proof. However, it is surprising how soon the study of the foundations of
mathematics recovered from this shock. Some, such as von Neumann, thought
that Hilbert’s aim of a proof of consistency of mathematics is lost forever, but
others such as Gerhard Gentzen, a student of Paul Bernays who was working
for Hilbert, soon regained hope. It took him only one year from Go¨del’s paper
of 1931 to realize that the consistency of arithmetic is not completely lost, even
if it cannot be shown in any Hilbertian strictly finitary way.
Gentzen cleared the way to the proof theory of arithmetic by first recasting
the logic of the connectives and quantifiers in a new form. In his magnificent
doctoral thesis Untersuchungen u¨ber das logische Schliessen (Investigations into
logical inference) of the year 1933, his objective was to study “the structure of
mathematical proofs as they appear in practice.” The setting of this task is
neutral; it does not commit Gentzen to any specific view on the foundations of
mathematics, be it formalism, intuitionism, or Cantorism.
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Gentzen presented first a general theory of the structure of mathematical
proofs. For each form of proposition, sufficient conditions for concluding it are
given: A conjunction A&B can be concluded if the premisses A and B have
been separately established, a conditional A ⊃ B can be concluded if B has
been proved from the assumption of A, and ∀xA(x) can be concluded if A(x)
has been proved for an arbitrary x.
The critical point in Gentzen’s explanation of conditional statements is to
avoid circularity: What if A itself is a conditional statement? Go¨del, for ex-
ample, made this objection in unpublished work of 1941: Gentzen’s “sufficient
ground” for concluding A ⊃ B amounts to a method that can convert an arbi-
trary proof of A into some proof of B. How, then, can one explain what such
direct proofs of conditional statements are if it is assumed that the notion of
arbitrary proof is understood? This specific problem found its final solution
only in the 1970s in the work of Michael Dummett and Per Martin-Lo¨f.
In addition to sufficient conditions for concluding a proposition of a given
form, Gentzen also gave reverse necessary conditions that state what we are
committed to if we assert a proposition of any of the forms considered. For
A&B these necessary conditions are A and B separately, for A ⊃ B they are
B on the assumption or proof that A holds, and for ∀xA(x) an instance A(a)
for any object a. We can collect the sufficient and necessary conditions for
propositions, here for the above three forms, into what is known as Gentzen’s






















1. Gentzen’s system of natural deduction.
In rule ⊃ I, the temporary assumption A has been closed, which is indicated by
the square brackets. Rule ∀I has a variable restriction: the variable x must not
occur free (not under the scope of a quantifier) in any assumptions on which
the premiss of the rule depends. The condition on the rule guarantees that the
property A(x) hold for an arbitrary x.
Two of the rules have two premisses. Formal proofs, called derivations, have
therefore the form of a tree the leaves of which are assumption formulas. By
rule &I, we can combine a derivation of A with any other previously derived
result B, and then make away with the latter by one of the rules &E. Thus,
there is no upper limit to how complicated derivations of a formula A can be.
Gentzen observed that successive applications of introduction and elimination
rules are detours in a derivation that can be eliminated. This is obvious with
rules &I and &E. With ⊃I and ⊃E, we observe that a derivation of the second
premiss A of rule ⊃E can substitute the assumption of A in the preceding rule
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⊃ I. Through an opportune combination, we have a derivation of B without
the pair of rules ⊃ I,⊃E: Take first the derivation of A, then continue to B as

























2. Conversion of introduction-elimination pairs.
The “conversion to normal form” holds quite generally for the logic of the con-
nectives and quantifiers (cf. e.g. Negri and von Plato, 2001). We can delete all
successive “I-E-pairs” to obtain a derivation with the property that all of its
formulas are contained, possibly as parts, in the open assumptions or the con-
clusion of the derivation. This subformula property was invented by Gentzen;
it gives an upper bound for the complexity of formulas that can appear in a
derivation in normal form. It often follows that there is an upper bound also
to the number of distinct formulas that can appear. When a logical calculus is
built in a right way, it further follows that there can be only a bounded num-
ber of different derivations in normal form, which gives a decision method for
derivability in the calculus in question. This is the case for the connectives, but
with the quantifiers, there is no general decision method. Each instance A(a)
is a subformula of both ∀xA(x) and ∃xA(x), but these are infinite in number if
the domain of individuals considered a, b, c, . . . is infinite.
Gentzen developed his central results on the structural analysis of proofs
for a calculus that differs somewhat from the calculus of natural deduction pre-
sented above: In his sequent calculus, all open assumptions are collected into
a list, let it be Γ, and the derivability of a formula C from assumptions Γ is
written as Γ→ C. Thus, the relation of derivability between a list of assump-
tions and a formula has been presented in a local way in one line, whereas in
natural deduction this relation has to be read from the root and the leaves of the
derivation tree. Sequent calculus has rules that correspond to the introduction
rules of natural deduction, and they transform the conclusion. Secondly, there
are rules that correspond to the elimination rules, and these transform the open
assumptions. Both transformations are always such that the formulas in the
premisses of a rule are subformulas of the conclusion. Derivations start from
sequents of the form A→ A that correspond to the assumption of a formula A,
and each rule adds some complexity to the left or right of the arrow.
The normal form of natural deduction, or the eliminability of “I-E-pairs,”
is expressed in sequent calculus through Gentzen’s famous cut rule. In a typical
case, we have a derivation of some result of interest C from assumptions A
and ∆, and in a second stage we succeed in establishing a lemma that shows
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A superfluous in the sense that it follows from some assumptions Γ that we
are prepared to accept, say axioms or previously established theorems. By the
lemma we have Γ → A, and by the main result we have A,∆ → C. The cut
rule combines these:
Γ→ A A,∆→ C
Γ,∆→ C Cut
Formula A has disappeared from the list of assumptions, and there is no a priori
bound on the complexity of possible cut formulas that might be needed in order
to derive Γ,∆→ C. Gentzen’s main result is a procedure by which applications
of the rule of cut can be eliminated from derivations. The subformula property is
then straightforward, with again an upper bound on the complexity of formulas
in a derivation.
Gentzen’s structural proof theory first covered logic, that is, the structure of
mathematical argument in general. However, his initial objective was to extend
the theory to arithmetic and analysis. Work on the former was completed in
1935, only two years after the doctoral dissertation. The derivations of formal-
ized Peano arithmetic are represented as trees constructed by suitable rules of
inference. Next these trees are ordered linearly in a certain way according to
their complexity and it is shown that if a contradiction is derivable, this ordering
has an infinite descending chain. The ordering Gentzen used is a “transfinite
induction up to the first ε-number.” Such a generalized induction characterizes
Peano arithmetic: The induction principle itself can be expressed in arithmetic,
but it follows from Go¨del’s results that it cannot be proved in arithmetic. Thus,
Gentzen’s transfinite induction is the first example of an “ordinary” arithmetical
statement that is unprovable in Peano arithmetic, whereas Go¨del’s unprovable
formula was obtained through an arithmetic coding of the provability relation,
a concept of the metamathematics of formalised systems. Gentzen also found
a direct proof of the unprovability of his transfinite induction principle, in his
paper of 1939, published in 1943, that marks the beginning of what is known
as ordinal proof theory.
In conclusion, Gentzen’s work solved the general part of Hilbert’s 24th prob-
lem, “to develop a theory of proof methods in mathematics,” as far as the gen-
eral principles of proof and proofs in elementary arithmetic are concerned. After
this success, Gentzen’s next natural aim was the proof theory of analysis, but
this work was in its beginnings when he died in tragic circumstances in August
1945 (for extensive and carefully detailed documentation on Gentzen’s personal
and scientific life the reader is referred to Menzler-Trott, 2007). Others have
continued the program, even if the difficulties have been great. The strength
of different subsystems of analysis is measured by determining what transfinite
principles are needed in order to prove these systems consistent.
Arithmetic and analysis were the first natural objectives of the proof theory
that Hilbert envisioned, brought to success in arithmetic, and with an ongoing
work in analysis. Other parts of mathematics have been left relatively untouched
by proof theorists. In our own work, we have found that the structure of proofs
can often be analyzed without encountering at all the kind of limitations that
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follow from Go¨del’s incompleteness results. Such limitations are met if the
theory in question has the natural numbers and their arithmetic built in.
It is possible to study, for example, elementary theories of order, lattice the-
ory, and elementary geometry by purely proof-theoretical means, by converting
their axioms into suitable systems of rules in what we have called proof analy-
sis, a methodology extensively studied in our monograph Negri and von Plato
(2011) and in a series of articles. Let us look at the theory of linear order as a
clear and concise example:
We have, as usual, a reflexive and transitive partial order relation a 6 b
to which the linearity postulate a 6 b ∨ b 6 a is added. Our proof analysis
of order relations uses Gentzen’s sequent calculus, but we can describe it here
at least approximately in terms of natural deduction. Reflexivity is taken into
account by letting derivation trees have formulas a 6 a as leaves. Transitivity
of order is the two-premiss rule by which a 6 c can be concluded whenever the
premisses a 6 b and b 6 c are at hand. The linearity postulate is translated into
a rule of inference as follows: Let a formula C be derived from the assumption
a 6 b, and let it also be derived from the assumption b 6 a. Both cases of the
linearity postulate have thus led to C, so the rule of linearity concludes C with
the assumptions a 6 b and b 6 a deleted from the list of open assumptions.












The two cases in linearity, here temporary assumptions, have been closed at the
inference.
The above inference seems to go against the subformula property: two for-
mulas seemed to disappear entirely from the list of open assumptions. However,
the following can be proved: If the derivation of C is of minimum size, mean-
ing that it cannot be locally shortened from here or there by the deletion of
a superfluous rule, say a two-premiss rule in which one premiss is identical to
the conclusion, then all the elements in the overall derivation, such as a and
b above, appear somewhere in the open assumptions or the conclusion. This
can be called the subterm property of minimum-size derivations, in analogy to
Gentzen’s subformula property of cut-free derivations. As a consequence of the
subterm property, the linearity postulate has only a bounded number of distinct
instances, with results such as the decidability of derivability for quantifier-free
formulas in a linear order as a consequence. In particular, the word problem for
a linear order receives a positive solution by a clear-cut analysis of the structure
of minimal derivations. The actual proof of the subterm property is far from
trivial: we consider an uppermost instance of the linearity rule, and above it,
we have instances of transitivity. It is shown that for any term, such as a and
b, there is at least one path up the derivation tree in which that term has to
appear in a formula, and it has to be a term in an open assumption at some
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point, or the derivation grows to infinity.
The conversion of mathematical axioms into rules added to a logical calculus
can be extended to other theories, such as the first-order theory of linear Heyt-
ing algebras. More specifically, one can show how rules in a sequent calculus
extended by mathematical rules correspond to rewrite rules for expressions of
the form a 6 b where a and b are terms in the algebra. Linearity allows one
to decompose such terms with rewrite rules for operations on both sides of the
order relation Consider the example (with the rewrite operation indicated by
→ ):
c 6 a∨b→ c 6 a ∨ c 6 b
As in linearity, there are two cases, but only under the assumption c 6 a∨b. In









Whenever C follows from each of the cases, it follows from the condition c 6 a∨b
that gives the cases. The rule in a formulation in sequent calculus is:1
c 6 a,Γ→ ∆ c 6 b,Γ→ ∆
c 6 a∨b,Γ→ ∆
Similar rules are found for rewrite conditions of the “exponentiation” operation
of Heyting algebras. This operation is characterized by the equivalence
c 6 ba ⊃⊂ c∧a 6 b
In the presence of linearity, one obtains the rewrite conditions (with 1 denoting
the top element of the algebra)
c 6 ba → c 6 b ∨ a 6 b ca 6 b→ c 6 b& (a 6 c ⊃ 1 6 b)
and corresponding sequent calculus rules. Dyckhoff and Negri (2006) developed
this approach and gave a simple decision method, based on terminating proof
search in a suitable sequent calculus, for the fragment of positively quantified
formulas of the first-order theory of linearly ordered Heyting algebras. (Posi-
tively quantified formulas are those in which the universal quantifier occurs only
in positive position, and the existential quantifier only in negative position.)
A natural question concerns the potential range of applications of the method-
ology of “axioms-as-rules.” Many interesting mathematical theories can be ex-
pressed by means of coherent/geometric2 implications: these are universal clo-
sures of formulas of the form C ⊃ D where C and D are first-order formulas
1In this rule, ∆ can represent a finite number of alternative cases rather than a single con-
clusion. The possibility to have more than one formulas to the right of the sequent arrow gives
what is called a multisuccedent sequent calculus, an approach that gives a greater generality.
2The terminology in the literature is not uniform and the name geometric is sometimes
reserved for axiomatizations of the mentioned form, sometimes for the more general case that
allows infinitary disjunctions. We shall follow here the first, finitary, sense.
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built up from atoms using conjunction, disjunction and existential quantifica-
tion. They include all algebraic theories, such as group theory and ring theory,
all essentially algebraic theories, such as category theory, the theory of fields,
the theory of local rings, lattice theory, projective geometry, the theory of sepa-
rably closed local rings, and the infinitary theory of torsion abelian groups (see
Dyckhoff and Negri 2015 for references). A useful normal form for such axiom-
atizations has C that consists of conjunctions of atoms and D of a disjunction
of existentially quantified conjunctions of atoms, i.e., any geometric implication
can be reduced to the form
∀x(&Pi ⊃ ∃y1M1 ∨ . . . ∨ ∃ynMn)
The Pi range over a finite set of atomic formulas and all the Mj are conjunctions
of atomic formulas Qji and the variables in the vector yj are not free in the Pi.
The general rule scheme that corresponds to the geometric axiom above is
Q1(z1/y1), P ,Γ→ ∆ . . . Qk(zk/yk), P ,Γ→ ∆
P ,Γ→ ∆
The scheme has the condition that its eigenvariables zi are not free in P ,Γ,∆.
Adding such a rule scheme to a suitable sequent calculus does not affect its
properties, most importantly that the rule of cut is not needed (a result proved
in Negri 2003), thus a coherent/geometric theory can be presented directly as a
sequent calculus rule system, with the mathematical rules each corresponding to
the conjuncts of the normal form of its axioms. Important examples of theories
that become in this way amenable to a cut-free sequent calculus treatment are
the theories of Robinson arithmetic and of real closed fields.
The conversion of geometric axiomatic theories into inference rules results
in a uniform treatment of theories based on classical and intuitionistic logic:
with multisuccedent sequent calculi the difference between the two logical sys-
tems is just in the rules for implication and the universal quantifier, whereas the
additional part corresponding to the geometric rules for the theory under con-
sideration is identical. By this uniformity, a striking application is obtained of
the method of conversion of geometric axioms into rules, namely an almost im-
mediate proof of the first-order Barr’s theorem, a central result of constructive
mathematics by which a classical proof of a geometric implication in a geometric
theory can be transformed into a constructive proof. It turned out that in a
cut-free system of sequent calculus with any collection of geometric rules, a clas-
sical proof of a geometric implication is already a constructive proof (cf. Negri
2003 and Negri and von Plato 2011). Although the term “geometric” for these
axiomatizations does not originate from geometry but from category theory,
geometric theories and their proof-theoretic treatment through the geometric
rule scheme have been employed for a formalization of Euclidean geometry in
Avigad et al. (2009) and for projective and affine geometry in Negri and von
Plato (ch. 10, 2011).
Not all first-order axioms are reducible to geometric implications. A gen-
eralization of geometric implications, originally motivated by problems in the
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proof-theoretic study of certain epistemic logics (cf. Maffezioli, Naibo, Negri,
2013), was introduced by Negri (2016), where a class GGI of first-order sen-
tences is defined recursively as follows: GA0 is the class of special coherent
implications3 ∀x.H0 ⊃ ∃y1H1 ∨ . . . ∨ ∃ymHm, and, for n > 0, GAn+1 is the
class of sentences ∀x.H ⊃ (∃y1G1 ∨ . . .∨∃ymGm), where each Hi is a (possibly
empty) conjunction of atoms, m > 0 and each Gi is a conjunction (with free
variables in x,yi) of sentences from GAk for k 6 n. With m = 0, the succe-
dent of the implication is just ⊥; likewise, sentences where H0 is the empty
conjunction > are identified with sentences from which the implication symbol
and its trivial antecedent are omitted. Sentences from GAn are implicitly also
sentences of GAn+1. GGI is then the union of the classes GAn for n > 0. The
subformulae Gi will be called GGI-subformulae.
It then follows that (i) a sentence in GGI has no negative occurrences of
implication (hence has no negative occurrences of negation, since ¬A is just an
abbreviation for A ⊃ ⊥) or universal quantification; (ii), conversely, a sentence
with this property is intuitionistically equivalent to a conjunction of sentences
in GGI.
Negri (2016) introduced “systems of rules” for the class GGI: alternations
of quantifiers are coded up through a prescribed order in which the added rules
and their eigenvariables may occur in a derivation, so that the rules require
extra book-keeping of the variable dependences.
As an example of an axiom in the class of generalized geometric implications,
consider the axiom of join semi-lattices:
∀xy∃z((x 6 z& y 6 z) &∀w(x 6 w& y 6 w ⊃ z 6 w)) lub-A
The system of rules consists of the following two rules of existence and
uniqueness of the least upper bound:
x 6 z, y 6 z,Γ→ ∆
Γ→ ∆ lub-E
z 6 w, x 6 w, y 6 w,Γ→ ∆
x 6 w, y 6 w,Γ→ ∆ lub-U
Rule lub-E has the condition that z is fresh (i.e., not in the conclusion of the
rule), whereas rule lub-U has the condition that in a derivation it should be
applied only above (but not necessarily immediately above) rule lub-E (and we
use the same x, y, z). This means that any derivation that uses rule lub-U must
have a branch of the following form, with the condition is that z is not free in
Γ,∆:
z 6 w, x 6 w, y 6 w,Γ′ → ∆′
x 6 w, y 6 w,Γ′ → ∆′ lub-U....
D....
x 6 z, y 6 z,Γ→ ∆
Γ→ ∆ lub-E
3Special coherent implications are a normal form for coherent implications, cf. def. 2.5 in
Dyckhoff and Negri, 2015.
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As an application of systems of rules, a generalisation of the first-order ver-
sion of Barr’s theorem, and in the spirit of Orevkov’s work (1968) on Glivenko
classes is proved: if the antecedent formulas of a single-succedent sequent are
GGI and the succedent formula is a coherent implication, then any classical
proof of the sequent can be transformed to an intuitionistic proof (see also Ne-
gri 2016a for these classes).
The method of axioms-as-rules can be extended further to any first-order
axiomatization, namely one can prove that any first-order axiom can be replaced
by a series of geometric rules which is built starting from either the conjunctive
or the disjunctive normal form of the axiom. The conversion to normal form
is not even necessary; in fact, one of the main results of Dyckhoff and Negri
(2015) is an algorithm of “coherentization” that preserves as much as possible
of the formula structure. This is detailed out in section 17 of the mentioned
paper. Compared to the approach of system of rules, this latter method is more
expressive, as it covers any first-order axiom, not just those in the class GGI,
and codifies the variable dependences through the addition of new predicate
symbols, with no need of external conditions on the order of application of the
rules. For example, to continue with the example of join semilattices, one adds
a new primitive ternary predicate J(x, y, z) (with the intended meaning that z
is the least upper bound of x and y) with the following rules (in the first, z is a
fresh variable):
J(x, y, z),Γ→ ∆
Γ→ ∆
x 6 z, y 6 z,Γ→ ∆
J(x, y, z),Γ→ ∆
z 6 w,Γ→ ∆
J(x, y, z), x 6 w, y 6 w,Γ→ ∆
It turns out that the above is a sequent calculus version of the fragment for
least upper bound of Skolem’s rules for relational lattice theory (cf. sec. 5.3 of
Negri and von Plato, 2011). The conversion of axioms into rules, presented in a
systematic way in Dyckhoff and Negri (2015), is a procedure that works in full
generality for all first-order theories. It can also be used to give an alternative
proof, purely based on proof analysis, of the result stating that any first-order
theory has a coherent conservative extension (cf. sec. 10 of Dyckhoff and Negri,
2015).
As a final example, and closer to Hilbert’s concerns around 1900 when he
formulated his last problem, the question of the independence of the paral-
lel postulate in plane affine geometry can be answered through proof analysis:
No derivation can end with the postulate in a system of geometric rules that
corresponds to the rest of the geometric axioms. The standard proof of inde-
pendence is based on models of non-Euclidean geometry, and these in turn are
based on real numbers and thereby on arithmetic. The proof-theoretic result
instead comes from a thoroughly elementary combinatorial property of minimal
derivation trees, namely the subterm property. The procedure by which such
minimal derivations are established is of extreme complexity.
The proof analysis that leads to the independence of the parallel postulate
shows, with the notation a ∈ l for the incidence of a point a on a line l and
par(l, a) for the parallel line construction, the underivability of the sequent
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b ∈ l, b ∈ par(l, a) → a ∈ l: in words, if point b is incident on line l and on
the parallel to l through point a, then also point a is incident on line l. The
contrapositive gives a traditional formulation: “If a given point is outside a
given line, then no point is on the line and its parallel through the given point.”
The system of rules of affine geometry obeys the subterm property. It follows
that there are only two rules that can be used to conclude the above sequent,
and that no rule can give the premisses of these rules. The consistency of this
system of geometry also follows at once from the subterm property. The result
is in stark contrast with Hilbert’s own statement of 1900, in the second of his
Paris problems:
In geometry, the proof of the consistency of the axioms can be ef-
fected by constructing a suitable field of numbers, such that analo-
gous relations between the numbers of this field correspond to the
geometrical axioms. Any contradiction in the deductions from the
geometrical axioms must thereupon be recognizable in the arithmetic
of this field of numbers. In this way the desired proof for the consis-
tency of the geometrical axioms is made to depend on the theorem
of the consistency of the arithmetical axioms
Hilbert obviously found this reduction of the consistency of geometry to that of
real arithmetic to be a step ahead, but Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem
of 1931, about the impossibility to prove even the consistency of elementary
arithmetic by finitistic means, teaches us differently: Direct finitary consistency
proofs for systems of geometry are also direct progress in what Hilbert called
“metamathematics.” Finally, we remark that the “local” shortening of deriva-
tions, as in the subterm property, is different from a shortest or simplest possible
proof in a global sense. For example, in the theory of linear order, we could apply
transitivity to the premisses a 6 a and a 6 b, with the conclusion a 6 b identical
to the second premiss. This situation is called a “loop” in the derivation. More
complicated loops can have any number of steps of derivation between them.
Our minimal derivations need not be shortest or simplest in any global sense:
the aim is just to have any finite bound on their size. Hilbert instead in the first
part of his last problem was asking for criteria of the simplicity of proofs in a
general sense. What these criteria could be is a question studied in the theory
of the complexity of proofs, in which general methods and results of complexity
theory are applied to derivation trees. Complexity theory has received a lot
of attention lately, especially through the popularity of the “P=NP” problem.
Our purpose here has been to discuss developments that answer to the general
part of Hilbert’s last problem.
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